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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s enlargement policy is universally recognized as contributing 
decisively to the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the two 
decades following the end of Communism. With the historic enlargements of 2004 
and 2007 the EU extended its borders to the east and to the south east. One important 
geopolitical consequence of the cumulative expansion process is that the EU is now a 
direct neighbour of all of the states of the Western Balkans. Utilizing the different 
templates employed in the design of the successful eastern enlargement policy, the 
EU is now engaged in a similar process of negotiations with the Western Balkan 
states which is designed to lead to membership and full incorporation in the 
institutional and policy regimes of the European Union.1  
 
The tragic context in which the EU’s relations with the Western Balkans developed 
along a separate and very different trajectory to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
after 1989 hardly needs to be pointed out. As CEE drew closer to the EU, the Western 
Balkans region was inflamed by a series of ethno-nationalist and inter-communal 
conflicts that splintered the old federal state of Yugoslavia and left more than two 
hundred thousand people dead. In the aftermath of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, 
EU engagement with the region, if painfully fitful and uneven from the perspective of 
the Western Balkans, was fashioned through a familiar mix of political, economic and 
institutional instruments. Gradually the EU has become the most important point of 
reference for the countries of the region as they recover from the destructive conflicts 
of the 1990s and seek to integrate into the successful structures of the European 
                                                 
1 At the EU-Western Balkans Summit meeting at Thessaloniki of June 2003 the EU stated emphatically 
that ‘the EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan 
countries. The future of the Balkans is within the European Union’. See: European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: the Western 
Balkans and European Integration’, Brussels: 21 May 2003, COM (2003) 285 final. The Thessaloniki 
‘promise’ was reiterated at the EU-Western Balkans ministerial meeting at Sarajevo on 2 June 2010 
where the EU provided ‘an unequivocal commitment to the European perspective of the Western 
Balkans’ and stated emphatically that ‘the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU’. 
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integration process. Just as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe sought to 
‘return to Europe’ in the 1990s, the EU’s gravitational pull has been the most 
important factor in the reconstitution of economic, political and civic life in the 
Western Balkans region over the past decade. The transformative potential offered by 
an ‘accession perspective’ is by now well known and documented within the vast 
corpus of writing on European integration studies (Dimitrova, 2003; O’Brennan, 
2006).  
 
In the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions in CEE, civil society played an important, if 
often neglected role, in providing an early legitimising rationale for the EU’s eastern 
enlargement process (Vachudova 200x). Similarly, across the Western Balkans civil 
society has sought a place for itself within the accession (and pre-accession) 
framework. This chapter examines the relationship between the European 
Commission (the EU’s principal actor within the enlargement process) and civil 
society in the Western Balkans region. It does so with the aim of understanding how 
the Commission has sought to engage with civil society, and what, if any, role civil 
society has played within the unfolding SAP and enlargement process.  
 
The Commission’s engagement with civil society derives from an understanding that 
the enlargement process, developed over decades as an elite-led process, derives at 
least some measure of legitimacy from the input of non state actors and groups which 
are closer to the citizens of prospective member states. Civil society support has been 
part of the EU accession framework since the mid 1990s and has developed in quite 
specific ways as a result of different but quite purposeful types of engagement on the 
part of both EU and external actors. The Commission’s approach to enlargement and 
SAP is highlighted as the most important element of the EU’s ‘Europeanization’ 
strategy for enlargement candidate states which has seen an effort to ‘modernize’, 
‘democratize’, ‘pluralize’ and transform the most fragile part of Europe and connect it 
progressively to the mainstream landscape of EU politics. The chapter argues, 
however, that the Commission’s approach to the Western Balkans, consistent with 
that employed during eastern enlargement and the ‘output’ legitimacy model of EU 
governance, has been a top-down one, with a preference for engagement with state 
actors and hierarchical rather than horizontal modes of communication and decision-
making. Although civil society has featured strongly in Commission rhetoric about 
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the ‘transformative potential’ of an EU-oriented Western Balkans, EU policy has in 
fact helped to neutralize any meaningful contribution by civil society actors and 
community sector as a substantive partner in governance. And although the 
Commission has at least broadened out the circle of participation in enlargement/SAP 
to include civil society as a stakeholder, the Commission’s engagement with the 
Western Balkans has been accession driven rather than community-centred, meaning 
that civil society has continued to play a subordinate part in the transforming 
landscape within the region. 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society is a notoriously fissiparous concept even if it is one that seems ever 
present in discussions of politics and society these days. Although there are multiple 
and sharply contrasting approaches to what constitutes a civil society (Ehrenberg, 
1999), and the very elasticity of definitional poles makes for confusion, most analysts 
argue that it is a necessary component of democracy, and - in the case of post-conflict 
societies -  an important, if insufficiently understood, element of the framework in 
which both inter-communal reconciliation and the consolidation of democracy is 
encouraged. Benjamin Barber (2001:270) places civil society within an understanding 
of democratic government as: ‘but an extension of the common power of citizens, and 
citizens must use that common power while working to reform its susceptibility to 
abuse’. He also argues that ‘there is no legislative domain that cannot be reframed and 
improved by thinking how it might promote civil society’ (Ibid.). In a world which 
has become increasingly deregulated, privatized, atomized and individualized there is 
surely a space where citizenship can be exercised in a progressive way and civil 
society make a meaningful contribution to governance.  
 
The notion of civil society is clearly a western concept, rooted in the democratic 
ideals of liberalism that focus on the individual as citizen, and the individual’s 
participation in differently configured elements of democratic and community life. 
This vision of society envisages citizens forming groups and associations with a view 
to influencing the policy-making process ‘by creating channels of communication 
between citizens and government, both direct and indirect’ (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2010: 
516). Thus civil society is seen as occupying a crucial space – an autonomous space - 
between elites and citizens, between the governors and the governed, and between the 
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state and the market. It is also important to acknowledge that each individual civil 
society group will be rooted in specifically local cultural and historical norms, 
practices and structures. Even groups with avowedly universalist aims will often 
demonstrate a firm identification with the local and domestic, even if this is 
sometimes at the expense of the universalist ethos and worldview it espouses. Wesley 
Scott and Likanen (2010:424) go further in positing civil society as ‘a political force 
central to the development of a wider community of values and societal goals; it is 
seen to have a modernizing and democratizing function within state-society relations’. 
Civil society is also ‘assumed to be a major political forum’ for the articulation of 
social agendas and collective rights (Ibid.) and in shaping political economy models. 
Until recently, most civil society groups were limited to placing issues on the agenda 
of executive decision-makers chiefly by lobbying and publicity. Increasingly, 
however, they have become authoritative actors in their own right, ‘with legitimacy 
derived from expertise, information, and innovative political techniques’ (Mansbach 
and Rafferty, 2008: 443) and in some jurisdictions, a distinct role in ensuring a better 
trade-off between efficiency and equity considerations (Kirby and Murphy, 2008: 38). 
 
Michael Edwards (2004, 2005), in positing civil society within a specific ‘public 
sphere’, argues that it ‘becomes the arena for argument and deliberation as well as for 
association and institutional collaboration’ and ‘a healthy associational ecosystem is 
vital to the public sphere, since it is usually through voluntary organizations and the 
media that citizens carry on their conversations’. Thus, for Edwards, civil society is 
‘simultaneously a goal to aim for, a means to achieve it, and a framework for 
engaging with each other about ends and means. When these three ‘faces’ turn 
towards each other and integrate their different perspectives into a mutually 
supportive framework’, elite decision-making can be positively impacted. Similarly, 
Parau (2009:122) argues that civil society empowerment should be defined relative to 
that of executive authority: ‘Civil society will have been empowered if it prevails 
upon the executive, that is, if its preferences are reflected in the final outcomes of 
domestic political outcomes, where otherwise they would have been disregarded’. 
How then do we define civil society ‘success’ within the European Union context in 
the Western Balkans region? To answer this question we need to understand both the 
civil society experience within the European integration process and the functional 
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frameworks of SAP and enlargement as these have developed under the supervision 
of the European Commission. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Although the EU is often identified as an elitist structure of power, scholarship has 
increasingly focused on transnational advocacy networks centred on the EU, and both 
the horizontal and vertical interactions provoked by civil society activity. The EU 
here is understood as a transnational and multilevel political opportunity structure 
(POS) which acts to structure patterns of civil society mobilization and access to 
decision-makers. (Cullen 2010: 320). One of the most sophisticated recent 
contributions to the literature comes from Beate Kohler Koch (2010: 106) who 
analyzes the multiple functions performed by civil society organizations across the 
European Union. In particular she identifies a ‘performative function’ centred on the 
formation and reformation of civil society ‘through discourse and interaction in the 
public sphere’. Accompanying this there is a ‘representative function’ which involves 
‘making civil society visible and giving societal interests a voice’. Here CSOs are 
understood as mediators between the local and the supranational centre in Brussels, 
echoing local points of view and policy concerns, bringing a diversity of views to the 
policy-making table, and thus contributing both to input and output legitimacy. Civil 
society actors face considerable constraints, however, when seeking to influence EU 
policy. They are constrained by the significant level of resources required to cultivate 
relations, prepare policy submissions and attend meetings. And although the European 
Commission has consistently held to a pluralist understanding of civil society, which 
includes all voluntary and non-profit organizations that give voice to the concerns of 
citizens in addition to market related actors, the evidence from the integration process 
suggests that this pluralism is a highly qualified and narrowly interpreted one. 
Research indicates that there is a significant gap between the official EU discourse 
about its relationship with civil society and its actual practice of consulting citizens 
and their representatives. Civil dialogue, for example, has seen a tendency on the part 
of the Commission to avoid interaction with civil society on controversial issues 
(Cullen 2010:322).  
 
The Commission’s preference for working with and through elites within civil society 
organizations has been well documented. Thus EU NGOs, despite achieving visibility 
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and prominence in carrying out their performative and representative functions, have 
also been categorized as lacking the critical distance required to mobilize for a radical 
shift in EU policy and of participating in consensus-oriented consultation processes 
devoid of substantive opportunities for deliberation. EU social NGOs in particular 
have been characterised as elite focused with weak links to grass root constituents. 
Scholars have also demonstrated that EU funding and project support to NGOs has 
often proved both conditional and highly selective. For sceptics of civil society 
efficacy this provides evidence of civil society co-optation and an inability to 
maintain independence from EU policy imperatives. Cullen (2010:323) also argues 
that many Commission officials remain sceptical of NGO claims to represent the 
public interest and rather view them as primarily lobbyists representing narrow 
constituencies and as sources of expert or technical information which can be fed into 
the policy process and – in output terms – as ‘vehicles to sell EU policy to EU citizens. 
Broader research also supports this interpretation of the Commission viewing civil 
society as one of ‘Communicating Europe’. This perspective does not involve 
stakeholders in any meaningful or robust way. Rather, civil society is conceived as 
‘occasional consultations and cheerleaders for European integration’. NGOs and civil 
actors become vehicles for pronouncements on the positive projects being overseen 
by Brussels. Thus the Commission’s approach to civil society has been at one and the 
same time open and pluralist and yet deliberately constructed as limited and utilitarian. 
This is not to argue that civil society has proved incapable of exerting pressure for 
policy change within the integration process. Rather the environment in which it 
operates is one which overwhelmingly favours the structural preferences of ‘insider’ 
institutional actors like the Commission.  
 
The nature of the EU’s political influence is now widely discussed. It constitutes a 
given in analysis of EU external relations, even if the claims made for the nature and 
reach of that influence are contested. Scholars have focused on the EU’s ‘soft power’, 
‘civilian power’, and ‘power of attraction’ in arguing for the impact of the normative 
content of EU policy and politics (Manners, 2002; O’Brennan, 2006). This, it is 
argued, is especially evident within the enlargement process where the asymmetric 
nature of the regime provides ample opportunity for ‘social learning’ and 
‘socialization’, or the effectiveness of EU ‘rule transfer’ through conditionality norms 
and practices. For our purposes the important element of this is how and under what 
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circumstances membership political conditionality demands convert into 
Europeanization of domestic political structures and arrangements in candidate states. 
Within that context how does conditionality and Europeanization impact on civil 
society and what role does the European Commission play in encouraging a 
substantive civil society contribution to enlargement politics and policies? Ergun 
(2010:5110 argues that the nature of these interactions will be influenced by three 
factors: the nature and activities of domestic CSOs and the relationships they establish 
with international networks; second, the relationship between civil society and the 
state and the state’s responsiveness to then activities of local civil society actors; and 
third government’s attitude to the international actors most engaged in their country 
and with civil society. By definition in the case of the EU this includes the European 
Commission as primus inter pares among enlargement actors on the EU side.  
 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND ENLARGEMENT 
The EU’s effort to successfully enlarge to the Western Balkans involves a complex 
division of labour (internally) between the EU institutions. Although the Commission 
plays a central bureaucratic role in the enlargement process this is balanced by the 
(territorial) input of both the Council and the (representative) functions of the 
European Parliament. The Commission’s influence within enlargement politics stems 
principally from two sources. The first is its formal power to initiate policy proposals, 
which helps it to set and shape the enlargement policy agenda. Although, as in the 
general integration framework, it seeks to anticipate, incorporate and adjust for the 
specific concerns of member states (and increasingly the EP), it has often found itself 
to be (almost by default) the sole policy entrepreneur and thus the best placed EU 
actor within the enlargement process. It is important to understand that much of the 
Commission’s power within the contemporary enlargement process evolved out of the 
early (uncertain) response by the EU to events in CEE in the early 1990s.  
 
The extraordinary challenge which confronted the European Commission when it 
took on the task of managing EU relations with the new democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe was quite unlike anything the Commission had previously faced in 
EU enlargement history. Although at many levels the Commission acted throughout 
the eastern enlargement process in conformity with Article 49 of the treaties - and 
thus as a classic bureaucratic agent of the member states of the EU - it seems clear 
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that the Commission also managed to carve out for itself a very significant 
independent role within the eastern enlargement. In the first place it is responsible for 
most of the important formal policy proposals that shape the deepening of relations 
with candidate and prospective candidate states. The Commission is both able and 
willing to act as an agenda setter and so frame the parameters of EU policy toward the 
Western Balkan states. And although more often than not its choice is to operate 
through coalitions within the Council, and where possible with the Presidency, it also 
frequently drives the EU agenda on key parts of the process.  
 
Where formal prerogatives are absent the Commission uses what scholars term 
‘customary enlargement practice’ to carve out an informal agenda setting role, 
framing problems and urging consensus where difficulties arise. Individual 
commissioners such as Gunter Verheugen and Ollie Rehn very often act as political 
entrepreneurs, and have proved themselves both proactive and integral to enlargement 
outcomes. And the Commission itself, through its capacity building and compliance 
functions within the process, is the EU institutional actor closest to the candidate 
states throughout the process, providing advice, urging broader and deeper 
transposition of EU norms, and actively socializing candidate state public 
representatives into EU practice.  
 
Viewed by the candidate states as ever-demanding and frequently unreasonable in its 
insistence on full and unconditional implementation of the acquis, viewed by the 
member states as too accommodating of candidate state preferences, the Commission 
often threads a thin line between process manager and political entrepreneur. In its 
engagement with the candidate states, imaginative framing of policy proposals within 
the EU, and not inconsiderable diplomatic skill in pushing the sometimes reluctant 
member states toward completion of the negotiations, the Commission performs the 
type of role which, if indeed unglamorous and hidden from the European public, is 
integral to the success story that enlargement has proved. It is thus quite certain that 
the Commission acts as a key ‘driver’ or ‘motor’ of the enlargement process. A role 
that developed out of the vacuum created by the fall of the Berlin Wall has evolved 
into a functional, normative and agenda-setting role that now dominates the 
Enlargement framework in the Western Balkans.  
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The eastern enlargement was the first such accession process to exhibit any kind of 
official role for civil society. The process of including civil society was, however, 
slow and evolutionary, and not without contradictions. In the aftermath of the 1989 
revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe civil society played an important, if often 
neglected role, in providing an early legitimising rationale for the EU’s eastern 
enlargement process (Vachudova; Dimitrova). Indeed in some respects the 
prominence of civil society actors in toppling communist regimes in the late 1980s 
may have led to unrealizable expectations about the potential reach and influence of 
civil society in reconstructing and consolidating democratic institutions and 
associational life in post communist Europe. In the developing enlargement 
framework it was the EU aid regime that provided the first opportunity structure for 
civil society participation in the political context. And crucially this participation 
developed out of specific interaction with the European Commission, as the latter 
took on the role of enlargement process manager on behalf of the EU. 
 
In 1991 it was simply stated that PHARE assistance contained a general commitment 
to recognize the value of non-governmental organizations while implementing 
PHARE projects2. In 1992, a special PHARE democracy programme was launched on 
the initiative of the European Parliament, in order to counter the exclusive emphasis 
on market based reforms. The programme aimed to support the establishment of 
political and civil institutions crucial for the achievement of political consensus and 
stability. Later studies would show that most of this support went into the 
‘development of NGOs’ The objectives of PHARE’s civil society programmes were 
‘to strengthen the capacity of leading institutions and to assist them in expanding the 
range of their activities, increasing their self-reliance and enhancing their participation 
in society and their support of NGOs’ (European Commission 1997: 53). The key 
here is that this engagement evolved as an element of Commission policy and was 
increasingly linked to the Commission’s priorities rather than local civil society 
actors’ priorities. Adaptation to EU norms and effective compliance with the acquis 
framed the Commission’s approach to civil society. Thus it was accession driven 
rather than demand driven; Commission driven rather than locally driven. This would 
                                                 
2 The French acronym for: ‘Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies’. 
 9
set the pattern for civil society participation in EU enlargement programmes which 
has continued to this day within the Western Balkans (and Turkey). 
 
THE COMMISSION AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
The role of civil society in legitimising EU governance has attracted growing 
attention within the EU’s developing relations with the Western Balkans. It is crucial, 
however, to understand that the European Commission’s engagement with civil 
society should be understood as a form of ‘output’ rather than ‘input’ legitimacy, 
where dialogue with ‘specialized publics’ takes place as a form of deliberation by 
specialist actors. Indeed ‘specialized publics’ are the ‘main constituency of the 
Commission’ according to Eriksen (2007). Here policy consultations take the form of 
institutionalized contacts by which the Commission seeks to obtain information 
covering both the subject issue and about their position on proposed legislation from 
stakeholders and civil society groups (Bouza Garcia: 170). Civil society acts as an 
intermediary between the citizen and the state, making at least some contribution to 
reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ in the enlargement domain, but 
nevertheless from a position which is distinctly subordinate to state actors. Civil 
society groups have been increasingly active in lobbying the EU over the last decade, 
but this involvement, even when successful, often fails to match the regularized and 
favoured input of private interest groups. And as Warleigh (200x) points out, the EU’s 
approach to civil society groups in the past has been open to question; the 
Commission in particular ‘has been guilty of trying to limit consultation to favourite 
NGOs which will essentially defend the Commission’s policy preferences, and 
sometimes even its role in the institutional process itself’.  
 
The Commission clearly orientates consultation with civil society actors towards 
output legitimacy, however, by framing the boundaries of discussion and room for 
compromise available to participating actors. It is clear that ‘in the design of the 
consultative fora the members are invited as experts, and in principle not on behalf of 
their organizations’ in any specific representative capacity. A characteristic feature is 
that they are easily ‘turned into specialized spaces’ where ‘knowledge of a policy 
field is more important’ than input legitimacy criteria (Bouza Garcia 2009:177). In 
this kind of environment it is easy to see why different forms of ‘cognitive 
dissonance’ arise between the representatives of many civil society groups in Brussels 
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and their constituency: they are effectively co-opted as experts and parts of an 
‘epistemic community’ by the Commission.  
 
The Commission, however, does not hold officially to such a ‘thin’ definition of civil 
society. In its own website summary it states: ‘the policy of consultation does not 
make a distinction between civil society organizations or other forms of interest 
groups. The Commission consults “interested parties”, which comprise all those who 
wish to participate in consultations run by the Commission’. Over time the 
Commission has elucidated a discourse about the role of civil society in the 
governance of the EU and has tried to present its institutionalized relations with civil 
society as part of a new mode of governance that would increase the legitimacy of the 
EU ‘through the participation and hence empowerment of citizens organizations’. 
Indeed the 2001 White Paper on governance indicates an effort ‘to translate these 
relationships into complimentary sources of legitimacy’. The document refers 
explicitly to a transnational public sphere as one in which ‘consultation becomes part 
of a discourse on re-legitimization from complementary models of (representative) 
democracy’ (Bouza Garcia: 174). The defeat of referendums in France, the 
Netherlands and Ireland in recent years, not to mention the fallout from the financial 
crisis and the unfolding in 2011 of the ‘Arab Spring’ in close geographical proximity 
to EU territory, has only re-focused thinking about engaging civil society as a 
supplement to the normal modes of (hierarchical) decision-making which dominate 
the EU.  
 
THE COMMISSION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
Civil society has played its part in reconstituting associational life and community in 
the Western Balkans since 1990, just as it did in CEE. Organizations such as the 
George Soros sponsored Open Society and the media group Balkan Insight have made 
a significant contribution to education and other spheres of public activity across the 
region and aimed to strengthen civil society’s position in relation to state power. But 
this is in a context where civil society during the Communist years had been firmly 
subordinated to the state and the Communist party. In the vacuum that followed the 
collapse of the Communist system, civil society and participatory politics was further 
constrained by war, conflict and displacement. Thus the challenge of civil society in 
the Western Balkans region has been incomparably greater than anywhere else in 
Eastern Europe after 1989. This weakness manifests itself especially in glaring 
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failures of governance, overt corruption, porus legal regimes, and an inability to 
redistribute resources in either an efficient or equitable manner. The Commission’s 
activity in the civil society realm has been both encouraged by and weakened by the 
fragility of local democratic models in the Western Balkans. But it seems clear that 
the relative weakness of the state has made it more difficult for civil society to play a 
full and proactive part in the reconstitution of civic and associational life in the 
Western Balkans. 
 
The Commission’s approach to civil society in the region can be summarized as a 
contradictory mix of rhetorical support and good intentions, offset by a familiar 
penchant for employing civil society in a utilitarian capacity as a means of more 
efficiently carrying out enlargement policy. The Commission’s understanding of 
enlargement encompasses a prominent role for civil society, at least in its stated 
position and policy documents. Here civil society is understood as a supporting 
element of the ‘normative power’ or ‘civilian power’ Europe, as ‘a force central to the 
development of a wider community of values and societal goals’, comprising a 
‘modernizing and democratizing function within state-society relations and a major 
forum for ‘the articulation – within and beyond the state – of social agendas and the 
promotion of human rights’ (Welsely Scott and Liikanen 2010: 424). And although 
the civil society sector is seen as subordinate to state actors, nevertheless it is viewed 
by the Commission as a not insignificant part of the machinery or architecture of 
(variously) the effort to stabilize, democratize, modernize, and ‘Europeanize’ the 
Western Balkans. The value of civil society for the Commission lies in its ability to 
provide local ownership over EU aid projects and efforts to ‘communicate Europe’; to 
act as a catalysing force for necessary local adaptation to EU norms; to act as a 
mediator between state and society within individual states and beyond at regional 
level; and to provide a legitimating rationale for EU policy. This perspective gained 
traction especially after the wide ranging review of EU policy which took place in 
2007. 
 
The Commission’s conception of the role of civil society in the Western Balkans is 
laid down in the 2010 Enlargement Strategy Paper. It asserts that: 
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Civil society activities are essential for a mature democracy, the respect for 
human rights and the rule of law. Such activities enhance political 
accountability, stimulate and expand the space for discourse on societal 
choices and strengthen the consensus for a pluralistic society. By contributing 
to a more open, participatory and dynamic democracy, a lively and vibrant 
civil society is also conducive to tolerance and reconciliation (2010:13).  
 
The emphasis on tolerance and reconciliation’ is clearly an acknowledgment that EU 
policy in the region has not to date produced the more benign, cooperative and 
pluralistic inter-communal environment that was hoped for in the aftermath of the 
Dayton settlement in 1995. While suggesting the EU possesses considerable power to 
influence local trajectories of development, it also qualifies this by asserting that this 
is usually subject to local interpretation and contestation. At a more concrete and 
practical level the Commission (ibid.: 14) suggests that:  
 
A culture of acceptance and appreciation of the role played by civil society 
need to be in place to allow civil society organizations to engage in an 
effective policy dialogue. Public consultation on policy initiatives and draft 
laws should become the general principle. The access of civil society to 
government support is frequently hindered by a lack of transparency and 
poorly developed allocation criteria. 
 
The Commission again alludes strongly to the fundamental weaknesses of civil 
society in the region when stating that a key EU aim is to: ‘strengthen their capacities 
and professionalism, allowing them to engage in an effective dialogue with public and 
private actors and to monitor developments in areas such as the rule of law and 
respect for fundamental rights’ (Ibid.). Consistent with previous enlargement rounds 
the Commission has implicitly linked civil society empowerment in the Western 
Balkans to the provision of accession-related aid programmes.  
 
Beginning with Croatia and Turkey in 2005, and extending it to the whole of the 
Western Balkans in 2006, the EU began to not only support increased communication 
and cooperation between EU member states and the candidate countries (civil 
dialogue), but it also began paying much more attention to the role of civil society in 
the democratization and reconciliation process taking place within these countries. 
These new priorities were spelled out in the Enlargement Strategy in 2007, in which 
the Commission made the development of civil society and civil dialogue one of the 
priority areas within the EU enlargement policy. The EU thus increased support 
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within this context by a factor of three comparing 2005-07 (€27 million) to 2008-10 
(€79 million) in the form of the Civil Society Facility (CSF) introduced into the  
operating framework of the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), the principal 
instrument for providing accession-related aid to candidate and SAP countries. It is 
the CSF initiative that made the Commission the biggest financial supporter of civil 
society in the region. (BCSDN 2009: 3). The Balkan Civil Society Development 
Network, an amalgam of the most influential civil society groups in the region, has 
produced the most substantive analysis of the Commission’s civil society engagement 
to date. It asserts that the aim of the CSF is three-fold: to support the development of 
civil society including capacity building; to expose civil society representatives to EU 
institutions and procedures; and to support partnership between civil society and other 
sectors as well as with counterparts in other countries of the region and the member 
states. (BCDSN 2009:14). It argues that the CSF represented the ‘concretization of the 
prioritized support to civil society development and civil dialogue on the part of the 
EU’ (BCSDN 2009:5). Additionally and for the first time, the Partnership principle 
(borrowed from the existing approach within EU regional policy) was enshrined in the 
IPA instrument, which envisaged the inclusion of civil society actors in the 
programming, implementation and evaluation practices within the Commission’s 
policies and programmes. Both the financial support and the establishment of a formal 
obligation to consult civil society significantly raised expectations among the local 
actors in the Western Balkans regarding the importance and value of the new IPA 
instrument (BCDSN: 5). For the European Commission, however, the most important 
frame of reference remained the drive for accession: EU funding and aid constitute a 
key vehicle supporting efforts to transpose and implement the accession acquis. 
Funding has to contribute to and underpin the most significant priorities attached to 
the reform programmes; if it also delivers a boost to the position and influence of civil 
society that is a welcome additional positive result. But this goal remains secondary to 
the state’s adaptation of law and administration to the acquis communautaire.  
 
Alongside an enhanced role for civil society within the unfolding EU aid regime, a 
second key priority for the Commission has been to encourage and facilitate a more 
substantive framework of regional cooperation among CSOs. Although ‘regionalism’ 
has tended to be resisted by state actors within the enlargement framework, the 
Commission sees it as a positive vehicle supporting inter-state reconciliation and 
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accelerated cross-border economic cooperation. Although the Commission has 
encouraged the transnational approach some CSOs have resisted such activity, for 
more or less the same reason as state actors (the fear that regionalism will dilute the 
bilateral relationship with Brussels). CSO transnationalism is especially evident in the 
groups which focus on human rights across the Western Balkans; these tend to be 
more universalistic and outward looking in their aims and modus operandi than other 
groups. In this sense they act – or have the potential to act – as a healthy 
counterweight to local actors which focus on a narrow range of particularistic, 
localized and sometimes patently chauvinistic demands. The damage wrought by 
particularism based on a perennialist conception of ethnic relations runs very deep in 
the Western Balkans region; civil society offers a channel for independent, moderate, 
and cooperative ideas in a context where state elites still tend to fall back on familiar 
nationalist tropes manifested in different forms of paranoia and ‘groupthink’. Thus the 
opportunity for reconciliation and engagement of previously warring ethno-national 
sub-units can be facilitated by civil society dialogue with external sponsorship of the 
European Commission. A key aim here is a form of socialization of such actors, not 
so much into a uniform or universalist way of thinking, but rather away from 
extremes of thinking and behaviour.  
 
This applies both to the traditional approach of inside-outside negotiations and the 
more day to day informal practices at the regional level: civil society has a role in 
both but is much more visible in the latter than the former. It is important to 
acknowledge here that CSOs do not faithfully replicate the ‘Brussels line’ and policy 
agenda within the enlargement process; they provide a crucial independent, non state 
voice and pressure on both domestic actors and the external actors within the 
framework. At times the very independence of local civil society actors is an asset for 
the Commission as it faces down domestic contestation of EU norms and the 
implementation of accession-driven legislation. Civil society can thus act as a more 
acceptable (internal) channel of representation and norm diffusion than any external 
agency or body. Turning somewhat on its head the traditional enlargement maxim that 
the Commission is the ‘friend who tells the truth’ very often CSOs can act as the 
‘friends who tell the Commission’s truths’ in a divisive local political context. For the 
Commission, where EU policy is expected to attract significant domestic policy costs 
and thus prove thoroughly contested by local actors, civil society provides an 
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important alternative channel of exercising influence, countering negative publicity, 
providing local voices of support, and mobilising ‘coalitions of the willing’ for action. 
Where the domestic costs of adaptation to EU norms is high CSOs can and do act in 
ways that elected local officials find difficult if not impossible. CSOs can thus take 
ownership over a process for EU sponsored reforms/legislation and push domestic 
actors towards compliance. There is much evidence for this activity within the eastern 
enlargement process. Environmental CSOs in particular proved very effective in 
changing the contours of domestic policy debate along cosmopolitan (over 
particularistic) and universalist lines favoured by the Commission (Soitu and Soitu 
(2010:495). 
 
Notwithstanding these positive developments in the role played by civil society in the 
Western Balkans, the evolution in Commission thinking about and management of the 
enlargement process places civil society within a very truncated operational space. 
Perhaps the most important lesson drawn from the eastern enlargement process by the 
bureaucracy was the need for consistent oversight of accession-driven reforms in 
candidate states. The introduction of benchmarks and a much more interventionist 
model of engagement by the Commission on rule of law issues and administrative 
reforms in candidate and SAP states has acted to re-inforce the existing tendency 
toward elite-centred interaction: the default structural landscape of an accession 
driven relationship between the Commission and candidate and SAP states effectively 
marginalizes all local actors outside the core executive and responsible ministries 
engaged in transposing and implementing the accession acquis. This applies as much 
to parliamentarians as it does to civil society; in both cases it acts to reduce the 
democratic legitimation of the enlargement process and further distance citizens from 
political engagement. The Commission, whilst paying lip service to the goal of civil 
society inclusion, often acts in a functional capacity to curtail or reduce the actual 
input of CSOs as it seeks substantive results from candidate/SAP states which will 
advance the accession process. The argument most frequently proffered in defence of 
this approach is that the most important priority is reform along a defined EU 
trajectory and that success will empower civil society indirectly through better quality 
public administration and a more transparent and structurally secure criminal justice 
system. 
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Guided by this janus-faced approach, the Commission has consistently exhibited a 
tendency toward hierarchical differentiation and conference-centred rather than 
community-centred activity on the part of so-called ‘elect’ civil society groups. The 
professionalization of community work and what has been termed ‘NGO-ization’ 
appears as a significant problem here. These groups are part of or over time become 
socialized into an elite transnational community centred on European integration 
practices: elites talk to themselves and do little to reduce the ‘democratic deficit’ said 
to characterize EU institutional politics. At its most extreme this is a world where 
civil society is not part of society but substitutes for society; organizations are 
essentially co-opted into an elite world of privilege and access and as such voluntarily 
dislodge themselves from their previous anchor in society.  
 
In the Western Balkans this separation of civil society from society takes the form of 
‘international’ versus ‘local’, where many NGOs are staffed by foreign nationals; 
such organizations often maintain a two track salary scale whereby the 
‘internationals’ get paid a ‘Western’ salary leaving their local employees to be paid in 
significantly lower amounts of local currency. Granted this international NGO sector 
represents just one part of the civil society sphere in the region but it remains a 
crucially important one. The impression here is of a process of co-option of favoured 
civil society groups, which increasingly tend toward elite engagement in Brussels and 
in the process lose touch with their roots in local society in the Western Balkans. The 
Commission’s over-riding priority of facilitating accession-driven ‘capacity building’ 
and governance reforms thus drives it to both co-opt and marginalize civil society 
whilst offering rhetorical blandishments centred on inclusion and participative 
democracy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The civil society input into enlargement decision-making in the Western Balkans is 
significant because as Mavrikos-Adamou (2010: 515) puts it ‘values such as trust, 
tolerance and cooperation are important for both the democratization process and for 
reconciling differences among diverse ethnic groups in post-conflict societies, and 
civil society can be the space where they are cultivated’. Given the tormented 
contemporary history of the Western Balkans region, this broad understanding of the 
potential contribution of civil society to the region seems wholly appropriate. More 
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broadly still, the Western Balkans region since the end of the Bosnian War in 1995, 
might be viewed as an extended laboratory for thinking about a wide constellation of 
phenomena such as post-conflict state-society relations, peace-building, nation-
building, and external intervention. The strength or weakness of the civil society 
sphere at the very least emerges as an important indicator of the degree to which 
reconciliation and democratic consolidation have been taking place.  
 
Assessing the role played by civil society in the Western Balkans one can 
undoubtedly point to some positive developments. It seems clear that since at least the 
Thessaloniki summit meeting in 2003 civil society actors have become both more 
visible on the ground and marginally more influential in policy circles. This 
generalized observation undoubtedly conceals widespread variations in visibility and 
power. Nevertheless the trend has been moving in a positive direction. Some of this is 
undoubtedly connected with the wider patterns of democratic consolidation in the 
region. But some of it also derives from the pressure placed on state actors by civil 
society organizations with European Commission support (rhetorical, financial and 
organizational). Such civil society groups have articulated and represented various 
ideological interests and political demands voiced by different segments of society as 
well as impressing on central government and otherwise stratified political elites the 
need for effective governance. Amongst the most visible such organizations have 
been Women’s organizations and human rights organizations, growing from 
grassroots level as voluntary associations and gradually attaining both visibility and 
some degree of influence.  
 
It seems clear that the European Commission faces a real dilemma in its approach to 
engagement with the Western Balkans in the accession context. One valuable 
academic source which might help us understand that dilemma is to examine it 
through the lens of Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies 
(1968). Huntington’s chief concerns here were with the relationship between state 
capacity and legitimation of the political process. He asserted that the two in fact 
could be separated: a country could grow and consolidate its institutions and stateness 
independent of their basis for legitimation. At the core of the Commission’s approach 
to the enlargement and SAP framework is this desire to balance the capacity of 
Western Balkan elites to provide effective governance and an administrative and 
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juridical system capable of adapting to the EU’s legal norms whilst underpinning 
these efforts with a substantive role for civil society. Where civil society could and – 
normatively speaking - should bridge the gap between state action and citizen 
empowerment, the Commission has usually sided (following Huntington’s precepts) 
with the imperative of achieving legal and administrative state compliance over any 
meaningful legitimation of those processes. Thus to some extent the enlargement/SAP 
regime has not just exacerbated existing tendencies toward elite capacity; it has also 
contributed to a growing problem of a specifically local and regional ‘democratic 
deficit’, familiar from the European Union and its political process. The demands of 
the accession process in both CEE previously, and latterly, the Western Balkans has, 
for example, taken power away from national parliaments as the Commission sought 
speedy adaptation to EU norms and engaged heavily with executive actors rather than 
parliament and civil society. National parliaments have thus been convincingly 
depicted as ‘victims’ of the enlargement process in the same way as patterns of 
‘deepening’ within the existing EU have also disempowered legislatures (O’ Brennan 
and Raunio, 2007). The evidence from the Western Balkans suggests that something 
similar is happening to civil society. Although the Commission, as the lead EU actor 
in the region, has aided and facilitated the civil society sector and sought to include it 
in public consultations and regional dialogue, these efforts have been accompanied by 
a sustained attachment to a top-down elite-driven enlargement model. Thus the 
advance by civil society in the Western Balkans continues to exhibit a stop-start 
quality and the legitimation of the accession process remains a doubtful proposition. 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Balkan Civil Society Development Network, 2009. The Successes and Failures of EU 
Pre-Accession Policy in the Balkans: support to Civil Society, 9 November, (Skopje: 
BCSDN) 
 
Barber, B., 2001, ‘How to make Society Civil and Democracy Strong’, in Anthony 
Giddens (Ed.), The Global Third Way Debate, (Cambridge, Polity), pp.269-279. 
 
 19
Bouza Garcia, L., 2009. ‘Can Segmented Publics foster a general public sphere in the 
EU? An example from the Consultation process practices of the European 
Commission’, Observatorio Journal, Volume 9, pp.169-85. 
 
European Council, 2003. Presidency Conclusions from Thessaloniki Summit, June 
 
Edwards, M., 2005. ‘Civil Society’, in The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, 
www.infed.org/association.civil_society.htm  
 
Edwards, M., 2004. Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity) 
 
Ehrenberg, J., 1999. Civil Society: the Critical History of an Idea, (New York: New 
York University Press). 
 
Ergun, A., 2010. ‘Civil Society in Turkey and Local Dimensions of Europeanization’, 
Journal of European Integration, Volume 32, Number 5, pp.507-22. 
 
European Commission, 2010. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-11, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, 
COM(2010) 660, Brussels, 9 November. 
 
Kirby, P. and Murphy, M., 2008. A Better Ireland is Possible: towards an Alternative 
Vision for Ireland, (Galway: Community Platform). 
 
Kohler-Koch, B., 2010. ‘Civil Society and EU Democracy: ‘astroturf’ 
Representation? Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 17, Number 1, pp.100-
16. 
 
Ladrech, R., 1994, ‘The Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: the 
Case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 32, Number 1, March 
 
Mansbach, R. and Rafferty, K., (2008), Introduction to Global Politics, (Abingdon 
and New York: Routledge). 
 
 20
Mavrikos-Adamou, T., 2010. ‘Challenges to Democracy Building and the Role of 
Civil Society, Democratization, Volume 17, Number 3, pp.514-33. 
 
O’Brennan, J. and Raunio, T., 2007. National Parliaments in an Enlarging European 
Union: from ‘victims’ of Integration to Competitive Actors? (Abingdon: Routledge.) 
 
O’Brennan,J.,2006.The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. (Abingdon: 
Routledge). 
 
Parau, C.E., 2009. ‘Impaling Dracula; how EU Accession Empowered Civil Society 
in Romania’, West European Politics, Volume 32, Number 1, pp.119-41. 
 
Smismans, S., 2003. ‘European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional 
Interests’, European Law Journal, Volume 9, Number 4, pp.473-95. 
 
Soitu, C. and Soitu, D., 2010. ‘Europeanization of the EU’s External Borders: the case 
of Romanian-Moldovan Civil Society Cooperation’, Journal of European Integration, 
Volume 32, Number 5, pp491-506. 
 
Warleigh, A., ‘Civil Society and Legitimate Governance in a Flexible Europe: Critical 
Deliberativism as a way forward’, in S. Smismans (Ed.) Civil Society and Legitimate 
European Governance  
 
Wesley Scott, J. and Liikanen, I., 2010. ‘Civil Society and the ‘Neighborrhood’ – 
Europeanization through Cross-Border Cooperation? Journal of European Integration, 
Volume 32, Number 5, pp.423-38. 
 
 
 21
